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~to Supreme Ct. Texas (per 
curiam) 
1. Summary. Does due process require a standard of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt to commit a person for an indefinite 
time for insanity? 
2. Facts. Frcn k Addington was civilly committed for an 
indefinite period of time after a jury determined that he was 
,, 
-2-
mentally ill and required hospitalization for his own protection 
and welfare and t~ of the community. At the commitment trial, 
appellant requested an instr~ction that the jury find he was insane 
and a danger to the community or to himself beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The trial judge refused the instruction, and instead charged 
) 
the jury that the burden of proof was "upon the State to prove each 
of the ..• special issues by clear and so~ncing evidence." (js at B-9 
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals reversed. It held that, -
in light of the serious deprivation of liberty involved in an 
indefinite commitment, the stigma that attached, and the inexactitude 
of the psychological sciences, the State should have to prove the 
necessary elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The State appealed to 
the Supreme Court of Texas. 
3. Opinion below(no dissents). The Texas Supreme Court 
reversed on the basis of State v. Turner, 556 SW 2d 563 (1977), 
decided by that court while this case was on appeal. State v. 
Turner is included in the jurisdictional statement. The Texas 
Supreme Court held that a mere preponderance of the evidence was 
sufficient, so that even the requirement of "clear and convincing 
evidence" was more than the Constitution required. There were four 
reasons. First, the loss of liberty was less severe in mental 
incompetency ~ommitments than in juvenile delinquency and criminal 
proceedings. The ~ourt thereby distinguished In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358 (1970). In mental commitment cases, the patient has a right to 
treatment, a right to periodic review of his continued treatment, and 
c -3-
a right to release when cured. Secondly, civil commitments were 
ordered on the basis of probabilities of future conduct, not 
proof of past acts. This distinguished both criminal and juvenile 
delinquency proceedings. Future probabilities were inherently 
more difficult to prove than past events, so the State should 
U be afforded more freedom on the standard of proof. Third, 
""
. '- i?tw" 
~' . the State's interest was beneficent, and there was a serious 
~· 
y,~t. risk of denying a person the care he needed because the State 
( _ 
could not prove the necessary elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Texas Court's last rationale was a summar; of the foregoing: 
the State had a parens patriae function to perform and the lower 
standard of proof was necessary to accomplish it. 
The Texas Supreme Court recognized that other jurisdictions 
required proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and some others imposed ---- ............... ~"""""--"" _. ........................ -
a clear and convincing evidence rule, wmle theCA 4 recognized 
a mere preponderance. The breakdown of the Circuit and State 
conflicts is as follows: 
PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED: 
, .C. Circuit, I n re Ballav, 482 F.2d 648 (1973)(civil commitment for 
insanity); bu t cf., United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 
· for civil commitment 
1973)(preponderance sufficient/where jury has returned verdict in 
criminal case of not guilty by reason of insanity). 
CA 7, United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 931 (1975) 
(under Illinois' sexually dangerous persoris act, so possibly distin-
guishable by reason of the greater stigma); 
-4-
Massachusetts, In re Andrews, 334 NE 2d 15 (1975)(also involving 
commitment under a sexually dangerous persons statute). 
PROOF BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE CONSTITUTIONALLY SUFFICIENT 
Florida, In re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481 (1977) ("clear and convincing") 
( c::------? 
Illinois, People v. Sansone, 309 NE 2d 733 (Ill.App. Ct. 1974) 
(Constitution requires more than mere preponderance, but 
beyond a reasonable doubt is not required) 
New Mexico, State v. Valdez, 540 P.2d 818 (1975) (Constitution require _ 
more than mere preponderance; "clear and convincing" is sufficient) 
Utah, In reWard M., 533 P.2d 896 (1975)(opinion by Henriod, C.J.) 
West Virginia, State ex rel Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 SE2d 109 (1974) 
("clear, cogent, and convincing" sufficient). 
PROOF BY MERE PREPONDERANCE SUFFICIENT 
CA 4, Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (1971), cert. dismissed 
sub nom. Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 
(1972). 
4. Contentions. Appellant challenges the premises underlying 
the Texas Supreme Court opinion. There is no recognized right to 
) 
treatment or right to release when cured under Texas State law; 
hence, the _asserted lesser infringement on liberty is not accurate. 
The greater difficulty in assessing future probabilities than past 
events argues for a stronger standard of proof, lest individuals be 
deprived of their liberty on the basis of vague probabilities. In 
-5-
this argument, appellant mirrors the Texas Court of Civil Appeals. 
The beneficent State purpose argument used by the Texas Court 
cannot stand after In re Winship and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), 
where the Court explicitly held that good intentions did not 
absolve a state from due process requirements before liberty 
was forfeited. And the same response serves to answer the 
Texas Supreme Court's parens patriae perspective: the state's 
interest might permit deprivations of liberty on the basis of 
probabilities, but those probabilities must still be proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Parens patriae is no license to smother 
individual rights. 
5. Discussion. This issue was presented in Murel v. Baltimore 
City Criminal Court, supra, but subsequent events mooted that case. 
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas argues that a standard 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required for 
indeterminate civil commitment. The J ogic of Winship is undeniably 
strong~ perhaps the clearest distinguishing aspect is the assessment 
of probabilities about the future involved in civil commitments as 
opposed to the fact-finding process in criminal and juvenile proceedin _ 
But on that question, the two Texas Courts express equally convincing, 
and perfectly opposite, arguments. This case is a strong candidate 
for noting probable jurisdiction, and I recommend that a response from 
the Attorney General of Texas be requested. 
2/15/78 Campbell 
There is no response. 
Opinions and 
Turner in js 
s-~, ~~-e- . 
~~J4~A-~ 
cj. ShJ:t-~ j)FW.SF~-
;iaf A...d- J ...__ ~ 4J 
~ t!? z...., ~~~~ . 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Nancy April 5, 1978 
RE: No. 77-5992, Addington v. Texas 
In a 2-page Motion to Dismiss, the State argues that 
the question presented is insubstantial. It notes, first, 
that the statute itself does not provide the standard of 
proof but only provides for commitment. (I do not think the 
State is arguing that this is not a proper appeal because 
it urges the Court to a DFWSFQ, not to dismiss for want of 
jurisdiction.) On the merits, the State says thatx this is 
a civil proceeding and theeefore should be governed by the 
preponderance standard. The State distinguishes juvenile 
proceedings on the ground that there the adjudication is 
concerned with past wrongdoing wher.eas here the conunitment 
is because of a person's emotional problems. 
I am not persuaded by the State's arguments. I am 
Court might postpone rather than note. On the other hand, 
this might be a propr appeal because the statute provides 
for conunitment without providing for allegedly required 
due process. 
On the merits, the conflkt
4
described by the 
• --preliminary memo will have to be resolved at some point, 
and the Court might as well do it in a case where the lower 
court has opted for the lowest standard of proof. 
Nancy 
Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . Hr f\ .L":t r.::JIO 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 .. . No. 77-5992 
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Motion of Appellant for 
Appointment of Counsel 
On April 17, the Court noted prob. jurisd. to consider whether 
the Due Process Clause requires proof of insanity beyond a reasonable 
doubt to accomplish a civil commitment to a mental institution. The 
Court also granted appellant's motion for leave to proceed ifp. 
Appellant, by his counsel of record in this Court (William P. 
Allison), now requests that Martha L. Boston be appointed to represent 
him. 
Ms. Boston has represented appellant throughout the proceedings 
below. She graduated from the University of Texas School of Law in 





this Court until May 9, 1978. Mr. Allison's association with thjs 
case apparently came about for no reason other than to furnish the 
signature of a member of this Bar. 
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RE: Addington v. Texas, No. 77-5992 
This is a very difficult case concerning the standard of ---proof constitutionally required in civil commitment proceedings. -
The briefs of the parties themselves are unimpressive, but 
fortunately several amici have supplied us with thorough, well-
written briefs. In particular, the brief for the American 
Psychiatric Association (APA), authored by Joel Klein, and the 
briefs for the National Center for Law and the Handicapped and 
for the National Association for Mental Health (NAMH) et al. are 
helpful. 
I. PRELIMINARY ISSUE 
The facts and the course of the proceedings in the Texas 
courts are adedquately described in the briefs. The only point I 
would stress is that although the Texas Supreme Court held that 
the "preponderance" standard is all that is required in civil 
commitment cases, the trial court actually gave "clear and 
c~ce" insJ:ruction~ to t~jury. This raises a 
question about what procedural course the Court should follow 
should it decide that the "clear and convincing evidence" test is 
proper. Klein's view is that because appellant received the 
benefit of the clear and convincing evidence standard, reversal 
is necessary only if the Court decides that the reasonable doubt 
standard is necessary. see APA Brief at 7 n.1. 
~
The National 
Association for Mental Health, by contrast, argues that even if 
the Court approves the clear and convincing evidence standard it 
should consider a remand. This is because the Texas Supreme 
Court has ruled that the clear and convincing test simply has no 
place in Texas jurisprudence. A remand, amicus says, would be 
necessary to allow that court to choose between adopting the 
clear and convincing test in response to this Court's holding, 
and imposing the reasaonable doubt test as the only available 
alternative, under state law, to the unacceptable preponderance 
2. 
test. see NAMH Brief at 5. _.._ 
The latter position seems correct to me. If the Texas 
court refuses, as a matter of state law, to adopt a clear and 
convincing evidence test, it would have to hold that appellant 
was entitled to reasonable doubt instuctions and therefore must 
be retried. Thus, contrary to Klein's suggestion, the adoption I by this Court of the clear and convincing test could affect the 
judgment of appellant's case on remand. 
II. PRINCIPAL QUESTION 
A 
Before deciding the ultimate question of what burden of 
proof is appropriate, the Court should take account of a less 
obvious, but equally important, aspect of this case. Although 
this appeal does not directly present for review the propriety of 
the substantive criteria used to commit appellant, the decision ~ 
~· 
of the Court may well have a direct bearing on the states' 
----------~--~--~--------~---- ------ability to rely on psychiatric diagnoses as grounds for civil 
commitment. This is because, as all responsible contributors to -the briefs in this case agree, psychiatric evidence does not 
readily lend itself to the traditional criminal-law formulation 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the imposition of the } 9f-
reasonable doubt standard would make it more difficult to obtain ~ 
judgments of civil commitment. Thus, if the Court opts for the ~ 
reasonable doubt standard, this might properly be understood as a 
step towards requiring proof of overt acts as a substantive 
criterion for civil commitment. It would therefore seem wise to 
give some consideration to the question of the extent to which 
psychiatric diagnoses may form the basis for involutary 
commitments. 
Klein's brief suggests persuasively that "the pragmatic 
realities of the adversary process make it apparent that a 
competent attorney almost invariably will be able to raise a 
reasonable doubt with respect to [the] medical criteria [that are 
involved in proving that an individual should be committed]." 
4. 
APA Brief at 19. Thus, the imposition of the reasonable doubt~ ·)~ 
standard might seriously impair the state's ability to care for) 
its mentally ill citizens. The briefs for the National Center 
for Law and the Handicapped and the NAMH, by contrast, focus 
the magnitude of the indiviudal interests at stake. They 
convincingly describe both the infringement on individual 
and the serious stigma that attach to civil commitment. They 
believe that the interest in minimizing the risk of erroneous! 
imposing such burdens is virtually as great as its counterpart 
the criminal law field. 
At the core of this disagreement, of course, is the 
question of how useful and trustworthy psychiatric diaqnosis 
really is. This is an intractable problem. On the one hand, the 
need to treat the mentally ill, sometimes against their expressed 
wisshes, seems apparent, and psychiatry, imperfect though it may 
be, is the only predictive tool we have. Unless we insist that a 
person actually harm himself or others before he may be 
~tv,~ ~ ,~_71~ 
~~~~~ 
~~ 
committed, we must necessarily rely on psychiatry, shored up with 
' 
whatever procedural safeguards will add . to its accuracy without 
(as Klein's brief says would be the case with the resaonble doubt 
standard) undermining its effectiveness altogether. Requiring 
that a person go so far as actually to commit self-destructive or 
anti-social (criminal) acts before permitting civil commitment 
surely would preclude treatment for many individuals about whom 
there could be a convincing demonstration, if not one beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that commitment desparately is needed and would 
be beneficial. 
On the other hand, I am impressed with the information 
offered by the brief of the ~ational Center for Law and the 
-----------------------
Handicapped at pp. 30-41. It is persuasively argued that 
psychiatric predictions are in fact wrong in a great many cases, 
5. 
some studies say in a majority of them. It is disconcerting 
the extreme to think of needlessly incarcerating substantial 
in 'Je-t- _ 
~ 
numbers of individuals, even as a trade-off for insuring the~~ 
availability of involuntary treatment for others who actually~~ 
~
need it. ~ 
Because this strikes me as an exceptionally important 
issue, and because it is not the precise question presented for 
review, I would recommend deciding this case in a way that leaves 
the question as open as possible for future consideration in a 
~ 
case where it is squarely presented. OnApossible way to do this 
would be to focus on the concept of "dangerousness." The most 
convincinq factual argument of the National Center's brief is 
that psychiatry is woefully inaccurate in predicting whether an 
. ,_. 
individual will commit violent acts towards other persons in the 
future. V:ee their brief at 34-41. Perhaps (I am unsure about 
this) it makes sense to distinguish between psychiatry's 
to diagnose the existence of mental illness suitable for 
treatment and even to predict a patient's inability adequately 
care for himself on the one hand and, on the other, its ability 
to predict that violent, anti-social acts will be committed. If 
the latter prediction is even arguably more difficult, it might 
be appropriate to rule narrowly that when a person is sought to 
be civilly committed on that basis, the state must prove its 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Several arguments could be advanced in support of such a 
holding. First, since dangerousness predictions seems to be so 
6. 
!3d 
unreliable, it might be sound to make the risk of error as small) ~
as possible as to this particular basis for civil commitment. ~ 
~ 
Second, since a predictive finding of dangerousness resembles a 
criminal conviction in important respects, it may carry with it 
an unusally onerous stigma which should not be inflicted in the 
absence of the most exacting judicial safequards. Third, to the 
extent the opinion in this case will necessarily anticipate 
future decisions on the permissibility of basing civil 
commitments on certain kinds of diagnostic evidence, it might not 
be inappropriate to lay the groundwork for a future holding that 
commitments based on dangerousness must be founded at least in 
part on proof of past conduct in which violence was threatened, 
if not performed. Cf. Lessard v. Sch~, 349 F.Supp. 1078 (E.D. 
Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded, 414 u.s. 473 (1974), 
.... ~7~ ~~~ ~-
~+~~~-
reinstated, 379 F.Supp. 1376 (E.o?!di~~-a~~ 
remanded, 421 u.s. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F.Supp. 1318 ~ ~ 
Wis. 1976). A reasonable doubt standard clearly would be 0J~~K 
~ 
appropriate if actual conduct, as opposed to the accuracy of a~ 
medical judgment were put in issue. J..o~ 
In this case, the iury was instructed that it could 
comit appellant if it found that he required hospitalization 
either for "his own welfare and protection," or for "the 
protection of others." The verdict did not specify which bas1s, 
if not both, was relied upon, but the evidence and arguments 
presented to the jury suggest that dangerousness may well have . - ~ 
been the controlling rationale. See Brief of NAMH at 13-15. ~ 
Thus, the Court cannot assume that appellant was not commi~ 
solely "for the protection of others," i.e., because he was 
dangerous. 
If, as suggested above, the Court were to hold no more -
than that civil commitments based on a finding of dangerousness ..-..___ 
to others must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, it would ~~ 
leave open for future development important issues that shou~ 
not be resolved until squarely presented and thoroughly brie~ 
In future case the Court would be free to extend this holdi~~ 
all civil commitment proceedings if it were convinced that ~~~ 
is required. On the other hand, consistent with Klein's  
observation that the standard of proof imposed should be 
considered in tandem with the substantive facts that must be 
proved to authorize commitment, see APA brief at 17-18, the Court 
would not preclude a future decision that the reasonable doubt 
standard is not appropriate when commitment is based solely upon 
the "grave disability" or "serious need for treatment" that some 
state statutes use as a basis for involuntary hospitalization. 
~~ appendix to Brief for NAMH. The narrow holding proposed also 
would leave the Court maximum flesibility in future holdings 
going to the substantive criteria themselves-- e.g., that 
psychiatric diagnosis of the existence of serious, treatable 
mental illness, as opposed to predicted dangerousness, is 
reliable enough to justify commitment. Because of the importance 
and difficulty of the issues, I would think that proceeding at a 
snail's pace as suggested in this memo might be the best way for 
the Court to deal with the problems of due process and 
involuntary mental health treatment. 
There remains the question 
treated initially: whether, apart from the troubling policy 
arguments discussed above, In · r~ ;wi~§hip, 397 u.s. 358 (1970), 
mandates reversal in this case. Appellant and two of the amici 
argue that since the nature of the infringement on liberty and 
the stigma associated with involuntary civil commitment for 
mental illenss are scarcely distinguishable from that involved 
with criminal adjudications, the holding in that case, that proof 
must be beyond a reasonable doubt, controls here. This is a 
difficult argum~nt to answer. In fact, insofar as it pertains to 
/"'- -~ - -
8. 









others, I find it compelling. Being incarcerated for treatment 
solely because a court or jury believes one will commit violent 
(i.e. criminal) acts in the future is simply too similar to being 
incarcerated for rehabilitation as a juvenile delinquent to 
justify different due process standards. Especially in light of 
psychiatry's poor track record in predicting dangerousness and 
the likelihood that the Court will someday require proof of 
actual or threatened overt acts to sustain commitments on this 
basis, it seems appropriate to require that the proof be beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
I do not understand Klein's brief to argue strongly to 
the contrary. As I read between the lines of his brief at pp. 18-
21, especially footnote 9, he seems to warn against imposing the 
reasonable doubt standard on civil commitments not based on 
dangerousness, while conceding that his opponents have a point to 
the extent they object to commitments based on findings that the 
individual will commit harmful acts in the future. 
But K~n may have a point when he argues that Winship )~ 
does not necessarily mandate the reasonable doubt standard fo~ 
all civil commitments. His discussion on pp 9-16 points out tA/~ 
important, if subtle, differences between some civil commitments 
~· 
and 'uvenile delinquency proceedings. In his Mathews v. Eldridge 
analysis for discovering due process requirements, Klein is 
persuasive that not all involuntary commitments must be 
accompanied by the procedural safeguards developed in the 
criminal law context. I will not repeat his arguments here, and 
I am not convinced that they are necessarily unimpeachable. But 
.. 
1 0. 
I do think it would be wise to reserve ruling on them as they 
apply to civil commitments not based on a finding of 
dangerousness. When the proper case arises, his arguments may 
properly prevail. 
The arguments of the State of Texas are not sound. The 
main thrust of its brief is that since the Court has not required 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the parole and probation 
revocation cases, which involve deprivations of liberty, the 
reasonable doubt standard is not required in civil commitment 
cases merely because they ingringe upon liberty interests. The 
obvious problem with this apporach, of course, is that a 
probationer or parolee has already lost his right to liberty 
through a criminal conviction and is free at the mercy of the 
state. The defendant in a civil commitment proceeding, by 
contrast, has an unconditional right to liberty until the state 
makes a sufficient showing that commitment is justified. The 
probation and parole revocation cases are therefore not 
particularly helpful. 
All amici seems to aqree either expressly or implicitly 
one one point: the preponderance of the evidence test is 
inadequate. Texas is apparently the only state expressly to 
adopt such a standard, although it is unclear in several other 
exactly what standard is applied. See appendix to Brief of _.......__ 
National Center for Law and the Handicapped. Amici seem correct. 
-~
Weighing the risk of error, the magnitude of the private 
interests involved, and the interests of the state in the balance 
as required by Mathews v. Eldridge, it seems highly doubtful that 
'. 
.· 
permitting civil commitment solely upon a finding that the 
evidence pointing to that conclusion is only slightly stronger 
than that going the other way comports with the Constitution. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In light of the difficulties of the issues involved and 
the nature of the single question presented, I would rule 
narrowly in this case. Amici NAMH and National Center for Law 
and the Handicapped have shown that civil commitments based on 
predictions of dangerousness are peculiarly subject to error. For 
this reason and because the stiqma and probable conditions of 
confinement are much like those associated with incarceration for 
criminal offenses and juvenile delinquency, proof should be 
beyond a reasonable doubt for civil commitments based solely on 
this ground, as the one in this case may well have been. I would 
leave open the question whether the same standard of proof should 
apply when commitment is on other grounds. 
1 1 • 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 77-5992 
Frank O'Neal Addington, 
Appellant, J On Appeal from 
v. Court of Texas. 
State of Texas. 
the Supreme 
[April -, 1979] 
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We noted probable jurisdiction of this appeal to determine 
what standard of proof is required by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution in a civil proceeding brought under 
state law to commit an individual involuntarily for an in-
definite period to a. sta.te mental hospital. 
I 
On seven occasions between 1969 and 1975 appellant was 
committed temporarily, Texas Mental Health Code Ann., Art. 
5547-31-39 (Vernon), to various Texas state mental hospitals 
and was committed for indefinite periods, id., at 5547- 40-57, 
to Austin State Hospital on three different occasions. On 
D:')cember 18, 1975, when appellant was arrested on a mis-
demeanor charge of "assault by threat" against his mother, 
the county and state mental health authorities therefore were 
well aware of his history of mental and emotional difficulties. 
Appellant's mother filed a petition for his indefinite com-
mitment in accordance with Texas law. The county psychi-
atric examiner interviewed appellant while in custody and 
after the interview issued a Certificate of Medical Examina-
tion for Mental Illness. In the Certificate, the examiner 
stated his opinion that appellant was "mentally ill and re-
~~~t-v~~~~~~ 
~ ~ J- ~u. ~,. ~/,....._/~ 4Jr?,fZ,_.. 
..A4 ~ ~ ~~/V--r/ ~ ~ ?'h,..,.,... ~. q. 
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quire[d] hospitalization in a mental hospital." Art. 5547-42. 
Appellant retained counsel and a trial was held before a 
jury to determine in accord with the statute : 
11(1) whether the proposed patient is mentally ill, and 
if so 
11 (2) whether he requires hospitalization in a mental 
hospital for his own welfare and protection or the pro-
tection of others, and if so 
11 (3) whether he is mentally incompetent." Art. 5547-
51. 
The trial on these issues extended over six days. 
The State offered evidence that appellant suffered from 
serious delusions, that he often had threatened to injure both 
of his parents and others, that he had been involved in several 
assaultive episodes while hospitalized and that he had caused 
substantial property damage both at his own apartment and 
at his parents' home. From these undisputed facts, two 
psychiatrists, who qualified as experts, expressed opinions that 
appellant suffered from psychotic schizophrenia and that he 
had paranoid tendencies. They also expressed medical opin-
. ions that appellant was probably dangerous both to himself 
and to others. They explained that appellant required hos-
pitalization in a closed area to treat his condition because in 
the past he had refused to attend out-patient treatment pro-
grams and had escaped several times from mental hospitals. 
Appellant did not contest the factual assertions made by 
the State's witnesses; indeed, he conceded that he suffered 
from a mental illness. What appellant attempted to show 
was that there was no substantial basis for concluding that 
he was probably dangerous to himself or others. 
The trial judge submitted the case to the jury with the 
instructions in the form of two questions : 
111) Based on clear, unequivocal and convincing evi-
dence, is Frank O'Neal Addington mentally ill? 
112) Based on clear, unequivocal and convincing evi-
77-5992-0PINION 
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dence, does Frank O'Neal Addington require hospitaliza-
tion in a mental hospital for his own welfare and pro-
tection or the protection of others?" 
Appellant objected to these instructions on several grounds, 
including the trial court's refusal to employ the "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" standard of proof. 
The jury found that a.ppellant was mentally ill and that he 
required hospitalization for his own or others' welfare. The 
trial court then entered an order committing appellant as a 
patient to Austin State Hospital for an indefinite period. 
Appellant appealed that order to the Texas Court of Civil 
Appeals, arguing, among other things, that the standards for 
commitment violated his substantive due process rights and 
that any standard of proof for commitment less than that 
required for criminal convictions, i. e., beyond a reasonable 
doubt, violated his procedural due process rights. The Court 
of Civil Appeals agreed with a.ppellant on the standard of 
proof issue and reversed the judgment of the trial court. 
Because of its treatment of the standard of proof, that court 
did not consider any of the other issues raised in the appeal. 
On appeal. the Texas Supreme Court reversed the Court of 
Civil Appeals' decision. In so holding the supreme court 
relied primarily upon its previous decision in State v. Turner; 
556 S. W. 2d 563 (Tex., cert. denied, 435 U.S. 929 (1977). 
In Turner, the Texas Supreme Court held that a "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" standard of proof in a civil 
commitment proceeding satisfied due process. The court 
declined to adopt the criminal law standard of "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" primarily because it questioned whether the 
State could prove by that exacting standard that a particular 
person would or would not be dangerous in the future. It 
also distinguished a civil commitment from a criminal convic-
tion by noting that under Texas law the mentally ill pa.tient 
has the right to treatment. periodic review of his condition 
and immediate release when no longer deemed to be a danger 
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to himself or others. Finally, the Turner court rejected the 
"clear and convincing" evidence standard because under Texas 
rules of procedure juries could be instructed only under a 
beyond a reasonable doubt or a preponderance standard of 
proof. 
Reaffirming Turner, the Texas Supreme Court in this case 
concluded that the trial court's instruction to the jury, al-
though not in conformity with the legal requirements, had 
benefited appellant, and hence the error was harmless. Ac-
cordingly, the court reinstated the judgment of the trial court. 
We noted probable jurisdiction, 435 U. S. 967, and we re-
verse and remand. 
II 
The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is 
embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of 
factfinding, is to "instruct the fact finder concerning the 
degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the 
correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of 
adjudication." In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 370 (1970) 
(Harlan, J., concurring). The standard serves to allocate the 
risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative 
importance attached to the ultimate decision. 
Generally speaking, the evolution of this area of the law 
has produced across a continuum three standards or levels 
of proof for different types of cases. At one end of the spec-
trum is the typical civil case involving a monetary dispute 
between private parties. Since society has a minimal con-
cern with the outcome of such private suits, plaintiff's burden 
of proof is a mere preponderance of the evidence. The liti-
gants thus share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion. 
In a criminal case, on the other hand, the interests of the 
defendant are of such magnitude that historically and without 
any explicit constitutional requirement they have been pro-
tected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as 
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posssible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment.1 In the 
administration of criminal justice our society imposes almost 
the entire risk of error upon itself. This is a.ccomplished by 
requiring under the Due Process Clause that the State prove 
the guilt of an accused beyond a reasonable doubt. In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
The intermediate standard, which usually employs some 
combination of the words "clear," "cogent," "unequivocal" 
and "convincing" is less commonly used, but nonetheless "is 
no stranger to the civil law." Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 
285 (1967). See also McCormick, Evidence § 320 (1954); 
9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2498 (3d ed. 1940). One typical use 
of the standard is in civil cases involving allegations of fraud 
or some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by the defendant. 
The interests at stake in those cases are deemed to be more 
substantial than mere loss of money and some jurisdictions 
accordingly reduce the risk to the defendant of having his 
reputation tarnished erroneously by increasing the plaintiff's 
burden of proof. Similarly, this Court has used the "clear 
and convincing" standard of proof to protect particularly 
important individual interests in various civil cases. See, 
e. g., Woodby v. INS, supra, at 285 (deportation); Chaunt v. 
United States, 364 t.T. S. 350. 353 (1960) (denaturalization); 
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125, 159 (1943) 
(denaturalization). 
Candor suggests that, to a degree, efforts to analyze what 
lay jurors understand concerning the differences among these 
three tests or the nuances of a judge's instructions on the law 
may well be largely an academic exercise, there are no directly 
1 Compare Morano, A Reexamination of the Development of the Reason-
able Doubt Rule, 55 B. U. L. Rev. 507 (1975) (reasonable doubt repre-
sented a 1('1';8 strict standard than previous common-law rules) with May, 
Some Rules of Evidence, 10 Am. L. Rev. 642 (1875) (reasonable doubt 
constituted a stricter rule than previous ones). See generally Underwood, 
The Thumb on the Scales of Ju8tice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal 
Cases, 86 Yale L. J. 1299 (1977). 
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relevant empirical studies upon which we are prepared to rely. 
Indeed, the ultimate truth as to how the staudards of proof 
affect decisionmaking may well be unknowable. given that 
factfinding is a process shared by countless thousands of indi-
viduals throughout the country. We probably can assume no 
more than that the difference between a preponderance of the 
evidence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt probably is 
better understood than either of them in relation to the inter-
mediate standard of clear and convincing evidence. Nonethe-
less, even if the particular stalldard-of-proof catch-words do 
not always make a great difference in a particular case. adopt-
ing a "standard of proof is more than an empty semantic 
exercise." Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F. 2d 1153. 1166 (CA4 
1971) (Sobeloff. J .. concurring and dissenting), cert. dismis11ed 
as improvidently granted sub 11om. Murel v. Baltimore City 
Criminal Court, 407 U. S. 355 (1972). In cases involving 
individual rights, whether criminal or civil, "the standard of 
proof at a minimum reflects the value society places ,on 
individual liberty." Ibid. 
III 
In considering what standard should govern in a civil com-
mitment proceeding, we must assess both the extent of the 
individual's interest in not being involuntarily confined indef-
initely and the State's interest in committing the emotionally 
disturbed under a particular standard of proof. Moreover, we 
must be mindful that "the function of legal process ... is to 
minimize the risk of erroneous decisions." Greenholtz v. 
Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, No. 
78-201, at 10; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,335 (1976); 
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-526 (1958). 
A 
This Court repeatedly has recognized that civil commitment 
for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty 
that requires due process pr9te~tion. See, e. g., Jackson v. 
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Indiana, 406 U. S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 
504 ( 1972) ; In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 ( 1967) ; Specht v. Patter-
son, 386 U. S. 605 (1967). Moreover, it is indisputable that 
involunta.ry commitment to a mental hospital after a finding 
of probable dangerousness to self or others can engender 
adverse social consequences to the individual. Whether we 
label this phenomena "stigma" or choose to call it something 
else is less important than that we recognize that it can occur 
and that it can have a very significant impact on the 
individual. 
The State has a legitimate interest under its paren.s patriae 
powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable, because 
of emotional disorders to care for themselves; the state also 
has authority under its police power to protect the community 
from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill. 
Under the Texas Mental Health Code, however, the State has 
no interest in confining individuals involuntarily if they are 
not mentally ill or if they do not pose some danger to them-
selves or others. Since the preponderance standard creates 
the risk of increasing the number of individuals erroneously 
committed, it is at least unclear to what extent, if any, the 
State's interests are furthered by using a preponderance stand-
ard in such commitment proceedings. 
The expanding concern of society in recent years with 
mental disorders is reflected in the fact that in the past few 
years many states have enacted statutes designed to protect 
the rights of the mentally ilL However, only one state has a 
statute that permits involuntary commitment by a mere pre-
ponderance of the evidence, Miss. Code Ann. § 41-21-75, and 
Texas is the only State where a court has concluded that the 
preponderance of the evidence standard satisfies due process. 
We attribute this not to any lack of concern in those states, 
but rather to a belief that the varying standards tend to 
produce comparable results. As we stated earlier, however, 
standards of proof are important for their symbolic meaning 
as well as for their practical effect. We conclude that the 
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individual's interest in the outcome of a civil commitment 
proceeding is of such weight and gravity that due process 
requires the State to justify confinement by proof more sub-
stantial than a mere preponderance of the evidence. The 
individual should not be asked to share equally with society 
the risk of error when the possible injury to the individual is 
significantly greater than any possible harm to the State. 
B 
Appellant urges the Court to hold that due process requires 
use of the criminal law's standard of proof-"beyond a reason-
able doubt." He argues that the rationale of the Winship 
holding that the criminal law standard of proof was required 
in a delinquency proceeding applies with equal force to a civil 
proceeding. 
In Winship, against the background of a gradual assimila-
tion of juvenile proceedings into traditional criminal prosecu-
tions, we declined to allow the State's "civil labels and good 
intentions" to "obviate the need for criminal due process safe-
guards in juvenile courts." 397 U.S., at 365-366. The Court 
saw no controlling difference in loss of liberty and stigma 
between a conviction for an adult and a delinquency adjudica-
tion for a juvenile. Winship recognized that the basic issue-
whether the individual in fact committed a criminal act-was 
the same in both proceedings. There being no meaningful 
distinctions between the two proceedings, we required the 
State to prove the juvenile's act and intent beyond a reason-
able doubt. 
There are significant reasons why different standards of 
proof are called for in civil commitment proceedings as 
opposed to criminal prosecutions. In a civil commitment 
the State's power cannot be exercised in any punitive sense. 
The Sta.te may confine only for the purpose of providing care 
designed to treat the individual. Jackson v. Indiana; 400: 
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U. S. 715 (1972).2 Unlike the delinquency proceeding in 
Winship, a civil commitment proceeding can in no sense be 
equated to a criminal prosecution. Cf. Woodby v. INS, supra, 
at 284-285. 
In addition, the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard 
historically has been reserved for criminal cases. This unique 
standard of proof, not prescribed or defined in the Constitu-
tion, is regarded as a critical part of the "moral force of the 
criminal law," 397 U. S., at 364, and we should hesitate to 
apply it too broadly or casually in noncriminal cases. Cf. 
ibid. 
The heavy standard applied in crimina] cases manifests our 
concern that the risk of error to the individual must be 
minimized even at the risk that some who are guilty might go 
free. Patterson v. New York , 432 U.S. 198, 208 (1977). The 
full force of that idea does not apply to a civil commitment. 
It may be true that an erroneous commitment is sometimes as 
undesirable as an erroneous conviction. 5 Wigmore, supra, at 
~ 1400. However. even though an erroneous confinement 
should be avoided in the first instance, the layers of profes-
sional review and observation of the patient's condition, and 
the concern of family and friends generally will provide con-
tinuous opportunities for an erroneous commitment to be cor-
rected. Moreover, it is not true that the release of a genuinely 
mentally ill person is no worse to the individual than the 
failure to convict the guilty. One who is suffering from a 
debilitating mental illness and in need of treatment is neither 
wholly at liberty nor free of stigma. See Chodoff, The Case 
for Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 133 Am. 
J. Psychiatry 496, 498 (1976); Schwartz, et al. , Psychiatric 
2 As the Texa H Supreme Court said in State v. T·urne1·, 556 S. W. 2d 563, 
566 (1977) : 
"The involuntar~· mental patient is rntitled to treatment, to periodic and 
reC'urrent re,·irw of his mr ntal condition, and to release at such time as he 
no longer prc;;cnt:s a danger to himsrlf and others." 
7'7-5992-0PINION 
10 ADDINGTON v. TEXAS 
Labeling and the Rehabilitation of the Mental Patient, 31 
Arch. Gen. Psychiatry 329, 335 (1974). It cannot be said, 
therefore, that it is much better for a mentally ill person to 
"go free" than for a mentally normal person to be committed, 
Finally, the initial inquiry in a civil commitment proceeding 
is very different from the central issue in either a delinquency 
proceeding or a criminal prosecution. In the latter cases the 
basic issue is a straightforward factual question-did the ac-
cused commit the act alleged. There may be factual issues to 
resolve in a commitment proceeding, but the factual aspects 
represent only the beginning of the inquiry. Whether the 
individual is menta.Ily ill and dangerous either to himself or 
others a.nd is in need of confined therapy turns on the meaning 
of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists 
and psychologists. Given the lack of certainty and the fal-
libility of psychiatric diagnosis, there is a serious question as 
to whether a State could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that an individual is both mentally ill and likely to be danger-
ous. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563, 584 (1976) 
(concurring opinion); Blocker v. United States, 110 U. S. 
App. D. C. 41 , 288 F . 2d 853, 860-861 (1961) (concurring 
opinion). See also Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F. 2d 1153, 1165 
(CA4 1973) (Sobeloff, J. , concurring and dissenting) , cert. 
dismissed as improvidently granted sub nom. Murel v. Balti-
"more City Criminal Courts, 407 U.S. 355 (1974); Note, Civil 
Commitment of the Mentally Ill. : Theories and Procedures, 
79 Harv. L. Rev. 1288, 1291 (1968) , Note, Due Process and 
the Development of "Criminal" Safeguards in Civil Commit-
ment Adjudications, 42 Ford. L. Rev. 611, 624 (1974). 
The subtleties and nuances of psychia.tric diagnosis render 
certainties virtually beyond reach in most situations. The 
reasonable doubt standard of criminal law functions in its 
realm because there the standard is addressed to specific, 
knowable facts. Psychiatric diagnosis, in contrast, is to a 
large extent based on medical "impressions" drawn from 
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~mbjective analysis and filtered through the experience of the 
diagnostician. This process often makes it very difficult for 
the expert physician to offer definite conclusions about any 
particular patient. Within the medical discipline, the tradi-
tional standa.rd for "factfinding" is a "reasonable medical 
certainty." If a trained psychiatrist has difficulty with the 
categorical "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, the un-
trained lay juror-or indeed even a trained judge-who is 
required to rely upon expert opinion could be forced by the 
criminal law standard of proof to reject commitment for many 
patients desperately in need of institutionalized psychiatric 
care. See Fordham Note, supra, at 624. Such "freedom" for 
a mentally ill person would be purchased at a high price. 
That practical considerations may limit a constitutionally 
based burden of proof is demonstrated by the reasonable doubt 
standard, which is a compromise between what is possible to 
prove and what protects the rights of the individual. If the 
State was required to guarantee error-free convictions, it would 
be required to prove guilt beyond all doubt. However, "[d]ue 
process does not require that every conceivable step be taken, 
at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an 
innocent person." Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 
(1977). Nor should the State be required to employ a stand-
ard of proof that may completely undercut its efforts to further 
the legitimate interests of both the State and the patient that 
are served by civil commitments. 
That some States have chosen-either legislatively or judi-
cially-to adopt the criminal law 3 gives no assurance that 
3 Haw. Rev. Stat. § 334-60 (4) (I); Idaho Code§ 66-329 (i); Kan. Stat. 
Ann. § 59-2917; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 38-1305 (7); Okla. Stat., 
'Tit. 43A, § 54.1 (C); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 426.130; Utah Code Ann. § 64-7-
36 (6); Wis. Stat. § 51.20 (14) (e); Superintendent of Worcester State 
Hospital v. Hagberg, 372 N. E. 2d 242 (Mass. 1978); Proctor v. Butler, 
'380 A. 2d 673 (NH 1977); In re Hodges, 325 A. 2d 605 (DC 1974); 
'Lausche v. Comm'r of Public Welfare, 302 Minn. 65, 225 N. W. 2d 366 
(1974), cert. denied, 420 U. S. 993 (1975). See also In re J. W., 44 N. J. 
-
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the more stringent standard of proof is needed or · is even 
adaptable to the needs of all States. The essence of federal-
ism is that States must be free to develop a variety of solutions 
to problems and not be forced into a common, uniform mold. 
As the substantive standards for civil commitment may vary 
from state to state, procedures must be a.llowed to va.ry so 
long as they meet the constitutional minimum. See Monahan 
& Wexler, A Definite Maybe: Proof and Probability in Civil 
Commitment, 2 Law & Human Behavior 49, 53--54 (1978); 
Share, The Standard of Proof in Involuntary Civil Commit-
ment Proceedings, 1977 Det. Coll. L. Rev. 209, 210. We 
conclude that it · is unnecessa.ry to require States to apply the 
strict, criminal standard. 
c 
Having concluded that the preponderance standard falls 
short of meeting the demands of due process and that the 
reasonable doubt standard is not required, we turn to a middle 
level of burden of proof that strikes a fair balance between 
the rights of the individual and the legitimate concerns of the 
State. We note that 20 States, most by statute, employ the 
standard of "clear and convincing" evidence; 4 three States use 
Super. 216, 130 A. 2d 64 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 24 N.J. 465, 132 A. 
2d 558 (1957); Danton v. Commonwealth, 383 S. W. 2d 681 (Ky. 1964) 
(dicta). 
4 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 36-540 ; Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 27-10-111 (1), Conn. 
·Gen. Stat. § 17-178 (c); Del. Code, Tit. 16, § 5010 (2); Ga. Code § 88-
501 (a); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 91%, § 3-808; Iowa Code § 229.12; La. Rev. 
Stat. Ann., Tit . 28, § 55E (Wetit); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 34, § 2334 
(5) (A)(1); Mich. Stat. Ann., § 14.800 (465) ; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1035 ; 
N. M. Stat. Ann.§ 34-2A-11C; N.D. Cent. Code§ 25-03.1-19; Ohio Rev. 
· Code Ann. § 5122.15 (B); Pa. Cons. Stat. Tit . 50, § 7304 (f); S. C. Code 
§ 44-17-580 ; S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 27A-9-18 ; Vt . Stat. Ann . Tit . 18, 
§ 7616 (b); Md. Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene Reg. 10.04.03G; ]n, 
re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1977). 
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1'clear, cogent, and convincing" evidence; 5 and two States 
require "clear, unequivocal and convincing" evidence.6 
In Woodby v. INS, 385 U. S. 276 (1967), dealing with 
deportation and Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 
125, 159 (1943), dealing with denaturalization, the Court held 
that "clear, unequivocal and convincing" evidence was the 
appropriate standard of proof. The term "unequivocal," 
taken by itself, means proof that admits of no doubt/ a 
burden approximating, if not exceeding, that used in criminal 
cases. The issues in Schneidermnn and Woodby were basically 
factual and therefore susceptible of objective proof and the 
consequences to the individual were unusually drastic-loss 
of citizenship and expulsion from the United States. 
We have concluded that the reasonable doubt standard is 
inappropriate in civil commitment proceedings because, given 
the uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis, it may impose a 
burden the State cannot meet and thereby erect an unreasona-
ble barrier to needed medical treatment. Similarly, we 
conclude that use of the term "unequivocal" is not constitu-
tionally required, although the States are free to use that 
standard. To meet due process demands, the standard has to 
inform the factfinder that the proof must be greater than the 
preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to other. 
categories of civil cases. 
We noted earlier that the trial court employed the standard 
of "clear, unequivocal and convincing" evidence in appellant's 
commitment hearing before a jury. That instruction was 
constitutionally adequate, however, the precise burden greater 
than a preponderance of the evidence that the Texas Supreme 
Court may choose to require is a matter of state law which 
5 N. C. Gen. Stat. § 122-58.7 (i); Wash. Rev. Code § 71 .05.310; State 
ex 1·el. Hawks v. Lazam, 202 S. E. 2d 109 (W. Va . 1974) . 
6 Ala. Code, Tit. 22, § 52-10 (a); Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-604 (d). 
7 See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2494 (1969). 
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we leave to that court.8 Accordingly, we remand the case for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
8 We noted earlier the couxt '~ holdil1g on harmless error. See p. 4, ante. 
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